Towards 1985
The Dalai Lama has proclaimed that he may visit Tibet in 1985 if the situation there becomes suitable. A certain benefit to the Tibetans from this announcement is that Peking will be compelled to go on making their life easier for the next two years so that their exiled leader will consider the situation favourable enough for a visit. This will at the least be of great propaganda value to Peking as the Tibetan case for self-determination will be considerably weakened. At the most, the visiting leader may be blackmailed into remaining there as a figurehead. The possibility of a convenient ‘accident’ also cannot be ruled out however elaborate the precautions. In either case the Tibet issue will effectively cease to exist ; and the ‘policy of leniency’ started six years previously will have achieved the desired result for Peking, and need no longer to continued.
The Chinese have been asking the Dalai Lama to return almost since the early sixties—at first with the demand of an unconditional surrender, and recently with promises of virtually everything except independence of Tibet. What has made the seeming dialogue possible is that the Dalai Lama has also stopped talking about ‘independence’ and is willing to settle for ‘complete and lasting happiness’ for his people. It is fair to assume, therefore, that he will consider the situation favourable for a visit when he is convinced that ‘complete and lasting happiness’ for the Tibetans is just round the corner. No one will deny that such a situation cannot prevail if the Tibetans do not enjoy all the basic human rights including freedom of thought, speech and action. The should, thus, have the right to choose their own leaders and to reject anyone they are not happy with. Then the popularly elected leaders should have the freedom to ensure that Tibet does not suffer in any way, economically and socially, because of the Chinese presence. That means Peking will have to maintain its military and civilian personnel in Tibet entirely at its own expenses, and for doing practically mothing. If defence of the country is given as the reason for Chinese military presence, Tibetans can reply that they are perfectly capable of deciding for themselves whether they need to be defended—and from whom.
It is a bit unlikely that Peking will agree to such a definition of ‘happiness’. The Chinese leaders will probably retort that surely, as everyone in the world knows, only they are qualified to tell if and when a population is happy.
For these reasons, it does not seem possible that the Dalai Lama will think the situation in Tibet suitable enough for a visit in 1985 or at any other time in the foreseeable future. And it serves the Chinese government right—for turning as entire nation into a vast prison for well over twenty years and then having the cheek to expect its legitimate leader to tell the world that they are doing a fine job.
The Dalai Lama has proclaimed that he may visit Tibet in 1985 if the situation there becomes suitable. A certain benefit to the Tibetans from this announcement is that Peking will be compelled to go on making their life easier for the next two years so that their exiled leader will consider the situation favourable enough for a visit. This will at the least be of great propaganda value to Peking as the Tibetan case for self-determination will be considerably weakened. At the most, the visiting leader may be blackmailed into remaining there as a figurehead. The possibility of a convenient ‘accident’ also cannot be ruled out however elaborate the precautions. In either case the Tibet issue will effectively cease to exist ; and the ‘policy of leniency’ started six years previously will have achieved the desired result for Peking, and need no longer to continued.
The Chinese have been asking the Dalai Lama to return almost since the early sixties—at first with the demand of an unconditional surrender, and recently with promises of virtually everything except independence of Tibet. What has made the seeming dialogue possible is that the Dalai Lama has also stopped talking about ‘independence’ and is willing to settle for ‘complete and lasting happiness’ for his people. It is fair to assume, therefore, that he will consider the situation favourable for a visit when he is convinced that ‘complete and lasting happiness’ for the Tibetans is just round the corner. No one will deny that such a situation cannot prevail if the Tibetans do not enjoy all the basic human rights including freedom of thought, speech and action. The should, thus, have the right to choose their own leaders and to reject anyone they are not happy with. Then the popularly elected leaders should have the freedom to ensure that Tibet does not suffer in any way, economically and socially, because of the Chinese presence. That means Peking will have to maintain its military and civilian personnel in Tibet entirely at its own expenses, and for doing practically mothing. If defence of the country is given as the reason for Chinese military presence, Tibetans can reply that they are perfectly capable of deciding for themselves whether they need to be defended—and from whom.
It is a bit unlikely that Peking will agree to such a definition of ‘happiness’. The Chinese leaders will probably retort that surely, as everyone in the world knows, only they are qualified to tell if and when a population is happy.
For these reasons, it does not seem possible that the Dalai Lama will think the situation in Tibet suitable enough for a visit in 1985 or at any other time in the foreseeable future. And it serves the Chinese government right—for turning as entire nation into a vast prison for well over twenty years and then having the cheek to expect its legitimate leader to tell the world that they are doing a fine job.
posted by editorla at
8:59 PM
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