Agreement with China
Peking cannot be blamed for viewing the Dalai Lama’s proposal for the future of Tibet as a ‘disquised form of independence.’ Under it, although bereft of the word ‘independent’, the people will have the full right to run the country as they collectively wish. Again, although, ‘foreign relations’ are to be handled by China, all non-political foreign affairs will be in the control of Tibetans. If Tibet want to become a zone of peace, what difference does it make who, on paper, is supposed to be looking after its foreign relations? This also makes a large defence force superfluous. Apart from China itself, we do not feel any threat to our national security. So it will be a kind of poetic justice to let the Chinese defend us from themselves. For these reasons, the Tibetans should not find the proposal in its present form unacceptable.
So far China has not rejected the proposal outright although clearly they are not very hapy about it. Peking does want a solution to its ‘Tibetan problem’; why else would it continue to invite the Dalai Lama for negotiations. It is possible that in time the Chinese would present their own modifications on the proposal. When that happens, the Tibetan government and the people will have to be very wary so that the spectre of the 1951 ‘agreement’ does not haunt them again. If negotiations on this framework continues, it will be long time before a version acceptable to both the chinese and Tibetan government emerges. Even then, the Dalai Lama has made it clear that Tibetans in and outside Tibet will decide its fate through a referendum. In order to prepare for that day, all Tibetan organisations should encourage among their members vigorous discussions on the contents of these formulations.
Finally, assuming that there will be version approved by the referendum as well, there must be some sort of international guarantee to ensure that neither side violates its terms. Besides the specific guarantors, the country should have trade missions and representatives of other non-political bodies from all friendly government. It should allow all international media to open bureaus in Lhasa. There should be a flawless communications network in the country on a priority basis. These precautions will make it difficult for China to resort to any 1951-type of excuses, such as ‘internal disturbances’ and ‘external interference’, to increase its hold on the country. They got away with it in 1951 because there were no witnesses to record and report the truth. We must not repeat that folly.
Peking cannot be blamed for viewing the Dalai Lama’s proposal for the future of Tibet as a ‘disquised form of independence.’ Under it, although bereft of the word ‘independent’, the people will have the full right to run the country as they collectively wish. Again, although, ‘foreign relations’ are to be handled by China, all non-political foreign affairs will be in the control of Tibetans. If Tibet want to become a zone of peace, what difference does it make who, on paper, is supposed to be looking after its foreign relations? This also makes a large defence force superfluous. Apart from China itself, we do not feel any threat to our national security. So it will be a kind of poetic justice to let the Chinese defend us from themselves. For these reasons, the Tibetans should not find the proposal in its present form unacceptable.
So far China has not rejected the proposal outright although clearly they are not very hapy about it. Peking does want a solution to its ‘Tibetan problem’; why else would it continue to invite the Dalai Lama for negotiations. It is possible that in time the Chinese would present their own modifications on the proposal. When that happens, the Tibetan government and the people will have to be very wary so that the spectre of the 1951 ‘agreement’ does not haunt them again. If negotiations on this framework continues, it will be long time before a version acceptable to both the chinese and Tibetan government emerges. Even then, the Dalai Lama has made it clear that Tibetans in and outside Tibet will decide its fate through a referendum. In order to prepare for that day, all Tibetan organisations should encourage among their members vigorous discussions on the contents of these formulations.
Finally, assuming that there will be version approved by the referendum as well, there must be some sort of international guarantee to ensure that neither side violates its terms. Besides the specific guarantors, the country should have trade missions and representatives of other non-political bodies from all friendly government. It should allow all international media to open bureaus in Lhasa. There should be a flawless communications network in the country on a priority basis. These precautions will make it difficult for China to resort to any 1951-type of excuses, such as ‘internal disturbances’ and ‘external interference’, to increase its hold on the country. They got away with it in 1951 because there were no witnesses to record and report the truth. We must not repeat that folly.
posted by editorla at
9:00 PM
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